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ABSTRACT: Burwell v. Hobby Lobby dramatically changed the landscape of
religious liberty protections afforded to corporations. The Supreme Court in
Hobby Lobby held that closely held for-profit corporations are entitled to
protection under the Religious Freedom and Restoration Act (RFRA) when
their sincerely held religious beliefs are contrary to a law of neutral
applicability. Holding this in the context of the Affordable Care Act's
contraceptive mandate, which requires almost all employer-sponsored health
insurance plans to cover preventative women's health care, including
contraception, the Court found that Hobby Lobby and Conestoga Wood
Specialties were entitled to a religious exemption from the mandate.
While the decision in Hobby Lobby was unprecedented, courts around the
country have employed similar rationales when claims of religious liberty
rights by employers butt up against claims of gender and pregnancy
discrimination by employees. Here, we track the parallels between how courts
have evaluated this issue in Title VII pregnancy discrimination cases and the
same issue in Hobby Lobby. We argue that often courts improperly subsume
the employee's personal reproductive and gender discrimination interest into
the employer's claim of religious liberty.
We examine how courts in several Title VII pregnancy discrimination
cases concluded that a religious employer's religious liberty claim, as
supported by a broad morality clause in an employment contract, should trump
an employee's civil rights assertion of a pregnancy discrimination claim. Then,
we connect our analysis of these cases to the decision in Hobby Lobby, noting
that the Court accepted so broadly defined religious liberty interests on the part
of Hobby Lobby and Conestoga that those interests similarly suppressed their
employees' interests in being free from gender discrimination in the workplace.
Ultimately, we argue that courts can and need to untangle the religious liberty
interests of employers from the gender discrimination interests of their
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employees in order to recognize when an employee's civil rights are being
subsumed into an employer's religious liberty right.
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INTRODUCTION
This past summer, the Supreme Court considered the scope of the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act's (ACA) contraceptive mandate' and its
exemptions 2 in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores. The controversy before the
Court centered on whether the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) or
the First Amendment's Free Exercise clause allow a for-profit corporation to
refuse to comply with the mandate. This paper does not directly address the
questions before the Court regarding whether for-profit corporations are
1. Section 2713(a)(4) of the Public Health Services Act (1944), as amended by the ACA, states
that:
A group health plan and a health insurance issuer offering group or individual health
insurance coverage shall, at a minimum provide coverage for and shall not impose any cost
sharing requirements for . . . additional preventative care and screenings not described in
paragraph (1) as provided for in comprehensive guidelines supported by the Health
Resources and Services Administration for the purposes of this paragraph.
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 2713(a)(4), 124 Stat. 131
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13). The corresponding Health Resources and Services Administration
(HRSA) guidelines, issued August I, 2011, explain that women's preventative health services include
well-visits, screening for gestational diabetes, HPV and HIV testing, STI counseling, breastfeeding
support and supplies, counseling for domestic violence, and contraceptive methods and counseling.
These guidelines define contraceptive services as "all FDA-approved contraceptive methods,
sterilization procedures, and patient education and counseling for all women with reproductive
capacity." Coverage of Certain Preventative Services Under the Affordable Care Act, Final Rules, 78
Fed. Reg. 39,870, 39,887 (July 2, 2013) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 147, 156).
2. See 78 Fed. Reg. at 39,871 (exempting "churches, their integrated auxiliaries, and conventions or
associations of churches, as well as to the exclusively religious activities of any religious order"); see id.
at 39,892 (providing an "accommodation" for certain non-profit entities).
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"persons" under RFRA, 3 whether the contraceptive mandate substantially
burdens the rights of for-profit corporations under RFRA or the Free Exercise
Clause,4 or whether the government has a compelling state interest to justify
enforcing the mandate and has done so (with regard to employers claiming
religious objection to the mandate) through narrowly tailored means. 5 Instead,
this paper uses the Hobby Lobby decision as a jumping-off point to examine
how courts evaluate gender discrimination claims involving religious
employers when those claims stem from "employer's actions [that are] based
on religiously inspired ideas about... sex[] and pregnancy." 6 Comparing Title
VII pregnancy discrimination cases brought against religious employers to the
Hobby Lobby litigation and decision, we argue that in both sets of cases courts
often improperly weigh the employee's personal reproductive and gender
discrimination interests, ultimately subsuming that interest into the employer's
religious liberty claim.
In Hobby Lobby the Court held that the contraceptive mandate violates
RFRA when the mandate is contrary to certain for-profit corporations' sincere
religious beliefs.7 Situating this decision within the larger question of whether
"religious organizations [should] be exempt from civil rights laws," 8 we argue
that the Court improperly accepted Hobby Lobby and Conestoga's assertions
that their religious beliefs permit them to be exempt from a law-the
contraceptive mandate-that seeks, at base, to eradicate "a vestige of gender
discrimination." 9 While the specific issue in Hobby Lobby was one of first
impression, we highlight that the Court's analysis echoes that seen in lower
courts' analysis in Title VII pregnancy discrimination cases brought against
religious employers. This paper tracks the parallels between courts' treatment
of employees' asserted reproductive and gender equity interests in Title VII
pregnancy discrimination cases brought against religious employers and the
Supreme Court's treatment of these same interests in Hobby Lobby. We then
propose alternative ways of examining and weighing the competing religious
liberty and gender equity interests.
Part I briefly introduces the parallels by outlining (1) the ACA's
contraceptive mandate and religious employer exemption and accommodation
and (2) Title VII's protections against gender and pregnancy discrimination and
3. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2755 (2014); Hobby Lobby Stores,
Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1129-37 (10th Cir. 2013); Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec'y
of the U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 724 F.3d 377, 381 (3d Cir. 2013).
4. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2755-58; Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1138-41.
5. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2780; Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1143-44.
6. Martha Minow, Should Religious Groups Be Exempt from Civil Rights Laws?, 48 B.C. L. REV.
781, 804 (2007). We draw on Minow's work throughout this article.
7. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2754-55.
8. Minow, supra note 6, at 782.
9. Brief for the American Civil Liberties Union as Amici Curiae Supporting Government at 7,
Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (No. 13-354).
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its exemption for religious employers. Part II examines several Title VII cases
brought against religious employers, analyzing how the courts weigh and
characterize the competing religious and gender equity/reproductive rights.'
0
We argue that the employee's gender equity/reproductive rights are often
improperly subsumed into religious organizations' assertions of religious
liberty based on the employer's self-defined, broad definitions of religious
doctrine. We note that this occurs, in large part, for two reasons: (1) courts fail
to determine, as a threshold matter, whether the policies (such as contractual
morality clauses) that the employers rely on are themselves discriminatory and
(2) courts accept that employers' asserted religious beliefs can trump Title VII
protections against gender/pregnancy discrimination. Part III argues that this
results in female employees' personal reproductive choices (which may be
grounded in the employees' own religious beliefs) being improperly subject to
religious and moral scrutiny by their employers, and that "this leaves female
employees who are engaging in what, in other contexts, are constitutionally and
statutorily protected activities related to reproduction in a much more
vulnerable position than it does other employees of the same religious
organizations." Part III also connects these pregnancy discrimination cases to
the recent Hobby Lobby decision, arguing that Hobby Lobby and Conestoga
similarly (and successfully) so broadly defined their religious liberty interests
that the employees' reproductive rights were suppressed. In Part IV, we
ultimately argue that courts need to untangle the religious beliefs of employers
from employees' reproductive rights and, more fundamentally, need to
recognize when the right to be free from gender discrimination is being
improperly subsumed by employer claims of religious liberty.
I. THE ACA AND TITLE VII
While the First Amendment and federal law (e.g. RFRA) generally protect
the exercise of religious rights, these protections are not absolute; broadly
stated, religious individuals and organizations generally are not exempted from
secular and neutral laws. 12 This is true of most laws governing employment
relationships; religious organizations are generally not exempt from, for
10. By "gender equity right," we mean the right to be free from different treatment in the workplace
based on one's gender. By "reproductive right," we mean the right to engage in reproductive decision-
making, like accessing contraception, utilizing assisted reproductive technology, or continuing a
pregnancy, without consequences for employment.
11. Jessica L. Waters, Testing Hosanna-Tabor: The Implications for Pregnancy Discrimination
Claims and Employees' Reproductive Rights, 9 STAN. J.C.R. & C.L. 47, 73 (2013). This article very
briefly looked at this issue and serves as jumping-off point for this piece.
12. See, e.g., Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879-80 (1990) ("[w]e have never held that an
individual's religious beliefs excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting
conduct that the State is free to regulate").
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example, wage and hour laws.' 3 However, in an effort to accommodate
religious beliefs, courts have recognized and some federal laws include limited
exceptions for religious employers-such as the exemption and
accommodation from the ACA's contraceptive mandate and Title VII's
exemption for religious employers.
A. The ACA and the Contraceptive Mandate
14
The ACA requires employers with fifty or more employees who offer
employee health insurance benefits to provide plans that meet a minimum level
of comprehensiveness to their employees. 15 The insurance plan must cover
preventative health services without cost sharing. 16 These required preventive
health services include coverage for contraceptives, as defined by HRSA
guidelines.' 7 According to the HRSA guidelines, contraceptives include "all
FDA-approved contraceptive methods, sterilization procedures, and patient
education and counseling for women with reproductive capacity."
' 8
The ACA's exemption for "religious employers" is a complete exemption
from the contraceptive mandate. Exempted is any organization that, "(1) [h]as
the inculcation of religious values as its purpose; (2) primarily employs persons
who share its religious tenets; (3) primarily serves persons who share its
religious tenets; and (4) is a nonprofit organization described in section
6033(a)(1) and (a)(3)(A)(i) or (iii) of the Code."'19 Importantly, this exemption
only applies to "churches, their integrated auxiliaries, and conventions or
associations of churches, as well as to the exclusively religious activities of any
religious order.",
20
In addition to the narrow exemption for religious employers, the
regulations also have an accommodation for certain non-profit organizations.
21
The accommodation requires that employees of eligible organizations receive
13. See, e.g., Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Scc'y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 303-06 (1985)
(holding that the minimum wage requirement does not interfere with the non-profit religious
organization's free exercise rights).
14. As we note above, this paper does not address the issue of whether for-profit corporations are
persons under RFRA or whether they can exercise First Amendment rights.
15. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1513, 124 Stat. 254
(codified at 26 U.S.C. § 4980H).
16. Id.
17. Coverage of Certain Preventative Services Under the Affordable Care Act; Final Rules, 78 Fed.




21. A non-profit seeking the accommodation must demonstrate that it: (1) "opposes providing
coverage for some or all of the contraceptive services required to be covered under §54.9815-
2713(a)(I)(iv) [of the PHS Act and the companion provisions of ERISA and the Code] on account of
religious objections;" (2) "is organized and operates as a nonprofit entity;" (3) "holds itself out as a
religious organization;" and (4) self-certifies that it satisfies the first three criteria. Id. at 39,892.
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contraceptive services benefits, as prescribed by the ACA and the HRSA
guidelines, but that the eligible organization need not participate in providing
those benefits.
22
In the Hobby Lobby case, Hobby Lobby's and Conestoga's owners
objected to participating in the provision of certain contraceptive methods on
religious grounds, 23 but, because both are for-profit organizations, they did not
fall under the exemption or qualify for the accommodation. 24 Both corporations
thus challenged the ACA's contraceptive coverage provision in federal court.
25
In Conestoga, the Third Circuit found that "for-profit, secular corporations
cannot engage in religious exercise, ' 26 and thus did not reach the merits of the
First Amendment and RFRA claims.27 In Hobby Lobby, however, the Tenth
Circuit held that for-profit corporations are entitled to RFRA's protection and
ultimately enjoined the enforcement of the ACA's contraceptive mandate
provisions against Hobby Lobby. 28 In doing so, the Tenth Circuit found that the
for-profit plaintiffs' exercise of religion was "substantially burdened" by the
contraceptive mandate,29 and that the government's asserted interests in "public
health and ... gender equality" were not compelling. 30 The Tenth Circuit also
held that that any burden placed on female employees was an "economic
burden" that did not create a compelling interest.
31
Before the Supreme Court, Hobby Lobby and Conestoga challenged the
contraceptive mandate as running afoul of their religious beliefs under RFRA
32
and, in Conestoga's case, the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause.
33
Ultimately, a majority of the Court held that the Health and Human Services
regulations requiring for-profit corporations to include contraceptive coverage
in employer-sponsored health insurance plans violates RFRA when providing
such coverage is contrary to the corporation's sincere religious beliefs.34
First, the Court addressed whether closely-held for-profit corporations,
such as Hobby Lobby and Conestoga, were intended to be beneficiaries of
RFRA protections. Relying on the Dictionary Act's definition of "person," the
Court determined that corporations are people, explaining that the "purpose [of
22. Id. at 39,874.
23. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1123-25 (10th Cir. 2013) (objecting to
Plan B, Ella, and IUDs); Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec'y of the U.S. Dep't of Health &
Human Servs., 7 24 F.3d 377, 381-82 (3d Cir. 2013) (objecting to Plan B and Ella).
24. Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1124; Conestoga, 724 F.3d at 381.
25. Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1125; Conestoga, 724 F.3d at 380-81.
26. Conestoga, 724 F.3d at 381.
27. Id. at 382-388.
28. Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1129-37.
29. Id. at 1137-38.
30. Id. at 1143.
31. Id. at 1144.
32. Brief for Respondents at 34-36, Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (No. 13-354); Brief for
Petitioners at 17-18, Conestoga, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (No. 13-356).
33. Brief for Petitioners at 18-19, Conestoga, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (No. 13-356).
34. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2759.
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extending rights to corporations] is to protect the rights of these people."
35
Additionally, the Court found that for-profit corporations are capable of
"exercising" the religious convictions of their shareholders. 36 Together, these
findings allowed the Court to hold that RFRA's protections apply to Hobby
Lobby and Conestoga in the contraceptive mandate controversy.
Next, the Court turned to the question of whether the contraceptive
mandate "substantially burdened" Hobby Lobby and Conestoga's "exercise of
religion." The majority had "little trouble concluding that it does."37 Speaking
solely to the financial burden associated with violating the mandate, the Court
explained that "[b]ecause the contraceptive mandate forces them to pay an
enormous sum of money.., the mandate clearly imposes a substantial burden
on those beliefs.,
38
Finally, the Court evaluated whether the government met the required
standard of having a compelling interest and a means of interfering with the
exercise of religion that was narrowly tailored to that interest. Despite dicta
about the government's stated interests in public health and gender equality as
being "broadly framed," the Court found it "unnecessary to adjudicate this
issue," and instead decided to "assume" that the government interests met the
RFRA compelling interest standard.39 In analyzing the final piece-the
narrowly tailored prong of the RFRA standard-the Court held that the
mandate failed.40 Because Health and Human Services already formulated an
accommodation for religious objections, albeit for religious non-profits, the
Court opined that a less restrictive means of achieving the government's
compelling interests exists and that it appropriately accommodates exercise of
religious beliefs, as protected under RFRA. 41 Finding the mandate failed the
narrowly tailored requirement, the Court struck down the contraceptive
mandate as applied to closely-held for-profit corporations that believe
implementing the mandate violates the sincere religious beliefs of their
shareholders.
42
B. Title VII and the Religious Organization Exemption
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act prohibits employment discrimination
on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, and prohibits
employers from refusing to hire, discharging, or otherwise discriminating
35. Id. at 2767-69.
36. Id. at 2772-74.
37. Id. at 2775.
38. Id. at 2779.
39. Id. at 2779-80.
40. Id. at 2780-83.
41. Id. at 2782-83.
42. Id. at 2759.
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against an employee on these protected bases.43  The 1978 Pregnancy
Discrimination Act amended Title VII to make clear that sex discrimination
includes discrimination based on "pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical
conditions" and that "women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related
medical conditions shall be treated the same [as other employees] for all
employment-related purposes. 44
Despite this broad mandate, Title VII's exemption for religious employers
provides that Title VII's protections do not apply to "a religious corporation,
association, educational institution, or society with respect to the employment
of individuals of a particular religion to perform work connected with the
carrying on by such corporation, association, educational institution, or society
of its activities,"45 and that educational institutions may "hire and employ
employees of a particular religion" under certain circumstances.46
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the agency charged with
enforcing Title VII, has made clear that the Title VII exemption is a very
limited one; the exemption "does not allow religious organizations otherwise to
discriminate in employment on protected bases other than religion, such as...
sex." 47 Plainly stated, religious organizations can discriminate in hiring and
firing on the basis of religion, but not on (for example) the basis of sex or
pregnancy. As illustrated in Part II, however, when courts face determinations
of whether pregnancy/sex discrimination took place when a religious
organization broadly defines its religious doctrine to include the private
reproductive decisions of its employees, the limits of the religious exemption
become less clear.
II. TITLE VII CASES: REFRAMING THE INTERESTS
As noted above, we are interested in the narrow question of how the
reproductive right and gender equity right are framed when weighed against an
employer's asserted religious liberty interest, be it in the context of RFRA or
Title VII.
We begin with Title VII. Martha Minow has outlined how attempts to
balance the competing interests-the employer's religious liberty interest and
43. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012).
44. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).
45. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-l(a).
46. 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-2(e)(2). This paper does not consider the scope of the ministerial exception,
which "is a separate judge-made exception rooted in the First Amendment designed to allow religious
organizations to hire and fire religious leaders according to any criteria they choose. The ministerial
exception is broad-it covers any kind of discrimination-but applies only to religious leaders, or those
whose duties are 'ministerial."' EEOC v. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch., 597 F.3d
769, 782 n. 1 (2010) (White, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
47. EEOC Compl. Man. (BNA) § 12-1 (July 22, 2008),
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/religion.html.
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the employee's interest in protection from employment discrimination-tip
differently depending on the type of discrimination at issue: "[R]eligious
groups largely receive no exemptions from laws prohibiting race
discrimination, some exemptions from laws forbidding gender discrimination,
and explicit and implicit exemptions from rules forbidding sexual orientation
discrimination. ' ' 8 That is, under statutory and case precedent, as well as
accepted social norms, a religious employer would be hard-pressed to justify-
legally or in the public arena-an assertion that its "religious beliefs" permit
racially discriminatory hiring. However, these same employers, using the same
Title VII statutory exemption, find much more success in arguing that their
religious beliefs permit discrimination based on sex, particularly when that
discrimination is based on reproductive decisions or status--e.g., pregnancy-
that are inextricably linked to one's sex.4 9 The cases discussed in Part II
illustrate that courts reviewing religious employers' firing of female employees
who become pregnant (or, shockingly, merely attempt to become pregnant)
often accept the employer's asserted religious liberty interest as paramount and
consider the employee's reproductive decisions to fall within the religious
employer's right to regulate through adverse employment actions (e.g. firing
the pregnant employee). An employee's statutorily protected right to become
pregnant without fear of an adverse employment action-as codified by Title
VII and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act-is instead often refrained as the
employee's choice to violate an employer's code of conduct or to violate a
morality clause in an employment contract. The decision to become pregnant, a
decision intricately linked to personal moral and religious beliefs, is framed as
being subject to the moral and religious scrutiny of the religious employer. This
leads courts to fundamentally adjudicate these cases as religious liberty cases
about the rights of the employer, rather than as pregnancy or gender
discrimination cases about the rights of the employee. This refraining allows
courts to give greater weight to the employer's asserted religious liberty
interest, while virtually disregarding the employee's protections against sex and
pregnancy discrimination. It also allows courts to ignore the reality that
48. Minow, supra note 6, at 782.
49. See, e.g., Henry v. Red Hill Lutheran Church of Tustin, 201 Cal. Rptr. 3d 15 (Cal. Ct. App.
2011) (barring a wrongful termination claim for having and raising a child out of wedlock on the basis
of the ministerial exception); Curay-Cramer v. Ursuline Acad., 450 F.3d 130 (3d Cir. 2006) (holding
that a Title VII sex discrimination claim for termination of employment after supporting an
advertisement in support of Roe v. Wade was invalid because Congress did not intend courts to apply
Title VII "in situations where it is impossible to avoid inquiry into a religious employer's religious
mission or the plausibility of its religious justification for an employment decision"); Little v. Wuerl,
929 F.2d 944 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that, in the firing of a teacher who remarried, Congress intended
the explicit exemptions to Title VII to enable religious organizations to create and maintain communities
composed solely of individuals faithful to their doctrinal practices, whether or not every individual plays
a direct role in the organization's "religious activities.").
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morality clauses aimed at sexual activity (and the results of sexual activity) can
serve as pretext for sex and pregnancy discrimination.
A. Boyd v. Harding Academy of Memphis
In Boyd v. Harding Academy of Memphis, Andrea Boyd, a preschool
teacher at a school associated with the Church of Christ, was fired after
becoming pregnant. When Boyd informed her supervisor that she was
pregnant, she was terminated. 5 1 Her supervisor explained that, "because [Boyd]
was pregnant and unwed, she set a bad example for the students and parents...
,,52 The supervisor also informed Boyd that, if she married the father of her
unborn child, she would become eligible for her position again. 53 Upon
termination, Boyd brought suit under Title VII for sex discrimination, claiming
that she was fired for being pregnant and unwed. 4 Harding Academy
responded that Boyd was legally fired under "the New Testament's proscription
on pre-marital sex." 55 By bench trial, the District Court found that Boyd did not
experience sex discrimination under Title VII but was fired for the
nondiscriminatory reason of violating the extramarital sex policy and that the
policy was applied in a nondiscriminatory manner by Harding Academy.
56
Boyd appealed and the Circuit Court wholly affirmed the District Court's
findings.
57
The courts in Boyd fundamentally framed the question before them as
whether the school properly applied its prohibition on premarital sex in Boyd's
case. And framing, of course, matters. The question, as framed, assumes the
validity of the morality clause, and asks only whether the way the employer
used the policy to fire Boyd was consistent and gender-neutral. By assuming
the validity of the prohibition on pre-marital sex, the courts focused primarily
on the application of the policy and thus framed the question as one of whether
the employer's religious liberty was adequately safeguarded, rather than if the
employee was protected from unlawful pregnancy discrimination.
Consequently, the courts never fully examined the morality clause itself,
including threshold questions of whether the policy itself was discriminatory.
50. Boyd v. Harding Acad. of Memphis, Inc., 88 F.3d 410, 411-12 (6th Cir. 1996).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. The supervisor described another teacher who was terminated under the same scenario who
later married the father of her child and was rehired.
54. Boyd v. Harding Acad. of Memphis, Inc., 887 F. Supp. 157, 158 (W.D. Tenn. 1995).
55. Id. at 158. On appeal, the policy was referred to as "Harding's policy against extramarital sex."
Boyd, 88 F.3d at 414-15.
56. Boyd, 887 F. Supp. at 158, 162 (noting that both male and female employees had been fired in
the preceding 30 years under this policy).
57. Boyd, 88 F.3d at 410, 415.
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The significant question that was not asked-and should be asked-was
whether the morality clause could comport with Title VII. The courts' framing,
however, reflects their willingness to subsume the employee's reproductive
right into the employer's religious liberty interest and assume the validity of a
morality clause-a reading that fails to separate out the distinct (and threshold)
question of whether the employer policy was itself discriminatory. Indeed,
federal regulations interpreting Title VII are explicit that this question must be
addressed, as "[a] written or unwritten employment policy or practice which
excludes from employment applicants or employees because of pregnancy,
childbirth or related medical conditions is in prima facie violation of Title
VII. ' '58 When this step is skipped, the application of the employment contract's
morality provisions-rather than the validity of the morality provisions and the
question of whether sex/pregnancy discrimination occurred-becomes the
controlling question.
In Boyd, the only reason the morality policy was triggered and employment
termination initiated was because of her pregnancy-indeed, she was explicitly
informed that she was being fired because she was "pregnant and unwed.,
59
This is, of course, prima facie evidence of pregnancy discrimination. Perhaps
even more startling in Boyd were the many questions regarding whether a
policy prohibiting extramarital sex even existed or whether Boyd was aware of
the policy. The only evidence proffered that there was a prohibition on
extramarital sex policy at Harding Academy was a general statement in the
staff handbook that said the school "expected [teachers] in all actions to be a
Christian example for the students ... ,60 In the absence of clear evidence of a
policy the court presumed that the common knowledge that Christianity
disapproves of sex outside of marriage,6 1 coupled with the Christian nature of
the school, amounted to a policy of prohibition on extramarital sex. The District
Court explained that Harding Academy used "as its religious tenets the
teachings of the New Testament, and one of the ... principles embodied therein
is that sex outside of marriage is proscribed., 62 That court repeatedly referred
58. Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10 (2011).
59. Boyd, 88 F.3d at 412.
60. Boyd, 887 F. Supp. at 158 n.I. While Harding Academy did not have an explicit policy
proscribing participation in extramarital sex, the District Court found, and the Circuit Court agreed, that
the school's handbook, which explained that "Christian character" and "professional ability" are the
bases of hiring decisions at the school, along with the requirement that teachers act as "Christian
example[s]" qualified as an employment policy against participation in extramarital sex. Id.; Boyd, 88
F.3d at 411. Boyd testified that she was not aware of the policy, but the District Court found that, since
Boyd knew Harding Academy was a Christian workplace and since she claimed on her employment
application to be Christian, there was no issue of whether the policy existed. Boyd, 887 F. Supp. at 158
n.I.
61. Boyd, 887 F. Supp. at 158 n.l. (noting that plaintiff testified in her deposition that she did not
know of any Christian religious organization that teaches that sexual activity among unmarried persons
is appropriate or moral).
62. Id. at 158.
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to Harding Academy's policy as "the New Testament's proscription on pre-
marital sex," 63 highlighting the doctrinal-and sweepingly broad-nature of
the policy. By emphasizing the religious nature of the proscription, rather than
looking to the validity of the handbook's content as employment policy, the
courts permitted the religious interest of Harding Academy to subsume Boyd's
interest in being free from pregnancy discrimination.
Relatedly, Boyd argued that Harding's asserted reason for firing her-the
morals clause in the handbook-was pretext for sex discrimination. She argued
that the policy was applied inconsistently in her case, as she was not terminated
when her supervisor found out that she had a miscarriage soon after she began
her employment at Harding and she was told that, if she were to marry the
64father of her child, she could be rehired. She also argued that because her
supervisor used the language of being "pregnant and unwed" as the reason for
her termination, the policy was being used a pretext for discrimination.
However, the courts did not agree. They found that the supervisor's
inconsistent application of the policy was "isolated ' 65 and did not "invalidate
that policy as a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for plaintiff's termination"
and that Boyd's reliance on her supervisor's comments "d[id] not establish the
defendant's proffered nondiscriminatory reason for plaintiffs termination was
pretextual."66
The courts' cursory analysis of the legitimate, non-discriminatory reason
and pretext issues implicitly elevated Harding's religious interests over Boyd's
reproductive right by ignoring the gendered nature of the morality clause and
related policies. Despite that some men and non-pregnant women were
terminated under the auspices of the same policy, 67 the fact that women have an
"inability to keep private her extramarital sex resulting in pregnancy" compared
to their male counterparts who can keep such a pregnancy private, "gives men a
clear upper hand in avoiding morality-based termination." 68 Simply put, Boyd's
premarital sexual activity never would have been discovered but for her
pregnancy. "Men and women will never be 'similarly situated' with respect to
morality requirements such as the ones these private schools claim to require,
because women are biologically more disposed to show the outward
manifestations of what a private religious school might view as immoral
behavior." 69 To find that Boyd was fired "not because of her pregnancy per se,
but because her pregnancy indicated that plaintiff engaged in sex outside of
63. Id.
64. Boyd, 88 F.3d at 412, 414.
65. Boyd, 887 F. Supp. at 161; Boyd, 88 F.3d at 414.
66. Boyd, 887 F. Supp. at 161.
67. Boyd, 88 F.3d. at 414.
68. Lauren E. Fisher, A Miscarriage of Justice: Pregnancy Discrimination in Sectarian Schools, 16
WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 529, 556 (2010).
69. Id. at 560.
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marriage as proscribed by Harding Academy," 70 blinks reality and ignores the
connections between sexual activity, sex/gender, and pregnancy.
B. Dias v. Archdiocese of Cincinnati
In a more recent case, Dias v. Archdiocese of Cincinnati, Christa Dias, a
computer technology coordinator for two of the Archdiocese of Cincinnati
schools, was fired after disclosing to her supervisor that she became pregnant
through the use of artificial insemination. 71 Dias's supervisor explained that she
was being fired both for being "pregnant and unmarried" and "pregnant by
means of artificial insemination." 72 Dias sued for pregnancy discrimination
under Title VII and under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 4112, as well as for
breach of contract without good cause.
73
On cross motions for summary judgment the Archdiocese conceded that
Dias made a prima facie case of pregnancy discrimination, but then argued that
she could not rebut its legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for firing her: her
violation of the morals clause in her employment contract that specified she
would, "comply with and act consistently in accordance with the stated
philosophy and teaching of the Roman Catholic Church., 74 They also argued
that Dias could not enforce her employment contract because she had "unclean
hands," as she, knowing it was prohibited by the morality clause, was in a
"long-term homosexual relationship . . . that she kept secret from the
Defendants. 7 5 In her motion for summary judgment, Dias argued that it was
irrelevant whether her pregnancy by means of artificial insemination was
included in the morality clause because "her Title VII rights trump any illegal
anti-pregnancy provision in a contract."7 6 The court denied Dias's motion in
full, but granted the Archdiocese's motion on the issue of Dias's contract claim,
adopting the unclean hands doctrine argument.
77
Unlike in Boyd, the Dias court analyzed the validity of the morality clause
and whether it comported with Title VII. In denying the Archdiocese's motion
for summary judgment on the issue of the Title VII claim, the court noted that
the clause might not have been valid, given the factual dispute as to whether
Dias knew that the clause included becoming pregnant by means of artificial
insemination. 78 This was an important step towards recognizing the employee's
70. Boyd, 887 F. Supp. at 159.
71. Dias v. Archdiocese of Cincinnati, No. 1: 11 -CV-00251, 2013 WL 360355
(S.D. Ohio 2013) (order granting Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment in part).
72. Id. at *1.
73. Id.
74. Id. at*I n.l.
75. Id. at *6
76. Id. at *2 (citing "doc 54," Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment).
77. Id. at *6.
78. Id.
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reproductive right; however, by adopting the Archdiocese's "unclean hands"
argument, the court avoided actually addressing the morality clause's validity.
Additionally, when deciding the motions for summary judgment, the court
explained, "[t]he morals clause in this case lacks specificity such that only an
evaluation of the decision-makers' testimony can show whether their initial
reason for terminating Plaintiff was simply enforcement of a policy against
premarital sex. This in the Court's view is a factual determination for a jury: to
answer why Defendant really terminated Plaintiff."7 9 While the court relied on
Boyd to imply that firing on the basis of an extramarital sex policy could be a
legitimate non-discriminatory reason for termination based on pregnancy, it
also said that the facts surrounding the morality clause matter. This is more
than the Boyd court did for acknowledging the reproductive right involved.
However, on the issue of whether being fired for being "pregnant and
unwed" constituted a violation of Title VII as a matter of law, the Dias court
firmly relied on Boyd, stating "the Court cannot adopt Plaintiffs view that
terminating an employee for being 'pregnant and unwed' automatically
amounts to a violation of Title VII."80 Instead, the court explained that a jury
must decide whether Dias was tenminated because she was pregnant or because
she violated a policy against extramarital sex.8 1 In this way, the court wholly
accepted Boyd's analysis and ignored the connection between sexual activity,
gender, and pregnancy.
Dias's case, however, is unlike Boyd's in that her alleged violation of
Archdiocese's morality clause was not due to extramarital sex, but to
impregnation via artificial insemination. 82 The Dias court acknowledged that
this was a "twist" from the Boyd analysis and that the Boyd court suggested that
becoming pregnant by artificial insemination might not constitute a legitimate
violation of the morality clause. However, it "nonetheless f[ound] no reason
that a policy against artificial insemination, like a policy against extra-marital
sex, could be upheld so long as it would be enforced in a gender-neutral
manner." 83 Under this rationale, the court concluded that Dias's tenrmination for
being pregnant via artificial insemination was not a per se violation of Title
VI1. 84
This is a significant expansion of the rationale in Boyd, where the policy
against extramarital sex was the asserted basis of the firing. Becoming pregnant
via artificial insemination does not implicate any provision against extramarital
sex, as by definition sexual intercourse is not involved. Rather, a firing on these
79. Id. at *5.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. It is not clear if it would have made a difference if she were married and became pregnant via
artificial insemination.
83. Id. at *6 (emphasis added).
84. Id. at *7.
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grounds is an explicit firing for being or attempting to become pregnant-the
very form of discrimination Title VII and the PDA seek to prohibit. In this way,
the Dias court's application of Boyd's rationale to a pregnancy by artificial
insemination enlarges the doctrine and gives enormous deference to the
religious liberty interest in claiming that the morality clause (which was never
analyzed for legitimacy), rather than the pregnancy, was the reason for the
employment termination.
Perhaps most telling is this: when a jury actually engaged in untangling the
claims of pregnancy discrimination and religious liberty, it found for Dias. The
jury awarded Dias $171,000 in back pay, compensatory and punitive damages
when the jury found that the Archdiocese "would [not] have made the same
decision if Ms. Dias's pregnancy had played no role in the employment
decision."
85
C. Herx v. Diocese of Fort Wayne-South Bend
86
It is worth briefly noting that we see similar framing in a case that just
resolved in December 2014. 87 In Herx v. Diocese of Fort Wayne-South Bend,
Emily Herx's contract to serve as a Language Arts teacher at a religious school
was not renewed for "improprieties related to church teachings or law."88 This
"impropriety" was Herx's use of in vitro fertilization.
89
Herx commenced suit in federal court, alleging, in part, that her non-
renewal ran afoul of Title VII. 90 Here, the employer's argument regarding
Herx's Title VII claim could not more clearly illustrate the framing and
entanglement issue so evident in Boyd and Dias. The Diocese argues:
It makes no difference that Herx claims she was discriminated against
on the basis of her sex or pregnancy status. It cannot reasonably be
disputed that the basis of the decision to not renew her Contract was
religious. A religious employer's religiously based decisions are
included within the religious employer exceptions to Title VII. The
85. Verdict Form at 3-4, Dias v. Archdiocese of Cincinnati, No. 1:11 -cv-251 (S.D. Ohio June 4,
2013), 2013 WL 2903167.
86. 1 previously discussed this case with regard to the ministerial exception in an article about
Hosanna. Waters, supra note 11.
87. At trial, the jury found in favor of Herx and awarded her almost $2,000,000 in general damages,
the majority for compensatory damages of pain and suffering. Verdict, Agreement and Settlement at 1,
Herx v. Diocese of Fort Wayne-South Bend, Inc., No. 1:12-cv- 122 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 19, 2014), 2014 WL
7692713. The court later adjusted this award to about $550,000 due to a statutory cap on compensatory
damages. Judgment in a Civil Action at 1, Herx v. Diocese of Fort Wayne-South Bend, Inc., No. 1:12-
cv-122 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 12, 2015), 2015 WL 355962.
88. Herx v. Diocese of Fort Wayne-South Bend, Inc., 48 F.Supp. 3d 1158, 1173 (N.D. Ind. 2014)
(order granting Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment).
89. Id.
90. Id.
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issue is not Herx's sex or pregnancy status, but only the specific
medical procedure, proscribed by Church Teachings, in which Herx
and her husband engaged. 91
The court, in deciding motions for summary judgment on the Title VII
claim, rejected the Diocese's broad application of the religious exemption,
explaining that, "Title VII doesn't give religious organizations the freedom to
make discriminatory decisions on the basis of race, sex, or national origin."
92
However, the court still framed the "triable issue" in a way that accepted the
employers' religious beliefs as grounds for firing a woman for her personal
reproductive decisions. The court explained that the question for trial would be,
"whether Mrs. Herx was nonrenewed because of her sex, or because of a
sincere belief about the morality of in vitro fertilization. ' '93 Once again, we see
a court framing the reproductive right as subject to employer's moral and
religious scrutiny under the auspices of a religious liberty interest. The
employer's belief is accepted as a legitimate basis for the nonrenewal; it is
accepted that the employer's beliefs, rather the employee's beliefs, control.
Framing a Title VII and pregnancy discrimination suit where the employee was
explicitly fired for attempting to become pregnant as not about sex or
pregnancy, and instead about the employer's asserted religious liberty right,
simply turns Title VII on its head.
What is perhaps most striking about these Title VII cases is that there is no
question that the employees were fired because of their protected decisions-
becoming or attempting to become pregnant. In the traditional Title VII case,
that would be the end of the story: Title VII does not permit discriminatory
firings. However, in the above scenarios where the supposedly permissible
grounds for firing an employee is not solely that she is pregnant but because
she is pregnant and unwed, or pregnant by artificial insemination, the firing is
considered to trigger questions of protecting the employer's religious beliefs as
defined by the employer's morality clause/policy. The reproductive/gender
equity right is entangled with the employer's asserted religious belief. Such a
reading cannot, however, be squared with the intent of Title VII. The correct
reading of the Title VII religious exemption cannot be that, once an employer
claims that its motives are religious it can discriminate against any
classification it considers religiously relevant, and be allowed to define the
scope of its religious beliefs. If this were the case, then religion would be a
blanket exemption from the law. These judicial decisions have allowed the
91. Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on the
Pleadings Dismissing Plaintiff's Complaint at 12-13, Herx v. Diocese of Fort Wayne-South Bend, Inc.,
No. 1:12-cv-122 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 5, 2012), 2012 WL 3870528 (emphasis added).
92. Herx, 48 F.Supp. 3dat 1175.
93. Id. at 1179.
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employers to define the scope and extent of their religious beliefs to subsume
other protected categories-namely, protections against sex and pregnancy
discrimination.
III. THE PARALLELS: RECASTING THE REPRODUCTIVE RIGHT IN THE ACA
CASES
The comparison between the Title VII and ACA cases is clearly not exact,
as in the ACA cases, the Court examined whether the government's
enforcement of the contraceptive mandate burdened the employers' religious
liberty. By contrast, in the Title VII cases, the courts determined whether the
employees' anti-discrimination protections had been violated by the employers'
actions. Nonetheless, we see parallel failures in the Title VII cases, the Hobby
Lobby and Conestoga briefing, and the Court's majority opinion. Hobby
Lobby, Conestoga, and the Supreme Court majority disregarded the burden
imposed upon employees' reproductive decision-making based on an
employer's broadly defined religious beliefs. This allowed the employer to
assert a religious liberty claim that subsumed any true consideration of the
employee's protections against sex discrimination, and, importantly, as we see
in the Title VII cases, disregarded the explicitly gendered nature of that burden.
In seeking to defend the mandate, the United States defined its interest in
enforcing the mandate by reference to the burden on female employees: it
contended that "the exemption respondents seek would deny those individuals
the health coverage to which they are legally entitled as part of their
employment compensation" and that the contraceptive mandate "serves
compelling interests in public health and gender equality." 94 The United States
further argued that "[i]ndividualized religion-based exemptions to that system
would directly and materially harm the very individuals the scheme was
intended to benefit."
95
In rebuttal, Hobby Lobby disregarded the burden on female employees,
and instead argued that:
First, the government's articulated compelling interests are woefully
deficient. Two-public health and gender equality-are defined so
broadly that they could never satisfy strict scrutiny .... The third...
94. Brief for the Petitioners at 14-15, Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (No. 13-354).
95. Id. at 38; see also Brief for the Respondents at 10, Conestoga, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (No. 13-356)
("The preventive-services coverage provision grants participants and beneficiaries in the Conestoga
group health plan privately enforceable benefits as part of a comprehensive insurance system established
by law. The exemption petitioners seek would deny those individuals the health coverage to which they
are legally entitled as part of their employment compensation-and which Congress intended to make
available generally through all forms of coverage available under the Affordable Care Act. The
provision also serves compelling interests in public health and gender equality.").
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-the promotion of a "comprehensive" scheme of providing benefits to
all-actually highlights the most glaring problem with the
government's defense of the mandate: the government has already
granted a bevy of exceptions to the mandate .... 96
Hobby Lobby also argued that "[w]hile public health and gender equality
are noble interests, they provide no better guidance in applying strict scrutiny
than the equally noble interest in promoting the general welfare. ' '97 Conestoga
similarly asserted that the "interests of 'equality' and 'health' [that the
mandate] ostensibly furthers are generic, inconsistently pursued, and
unsupported by evidence showing the Mandate causes them to a compelling
degree."
98
The Supreme Court's decision, likewise, virtually disregarded the burden
placed on the female employees who would not have contraceptive coverage
through their employer-sponsored health insurance plan. Indeed, the Court
simply stated that extending the religious accommodation to for-profit
corporations would allow female employees to "continue to receive
contraceptive coverage without cost-sharing" and "face minimal logistical and
administrative obstacles." 99 The actual burdens, however, are far from minimal.
First, the accommodation has the potential to affect many more women than
Hobby Lobby's and Conestoga's employees: the U.S. Chamber of Congress
notes that more than half of the United States' workforce is employed by
closely-held corporations.100 As such, even the "minimal" burdens on female
employees that the majority acknowledges will be required by the
accommodation could have a very broad impact. Second, as amici ACLU
argued, "[w]ithout access to contraception, women's ability to complete an
education, to hold a job, to advance in their careers, to care for their existing
children, or to aspire to a higher place, whatever that may be, is
compromised."' 0 1 The government's interests in eradicating these burdens on
reproductive decision-making are "concrete, specific, and demonstrated by a
wealth of empirical evidence."' 0 2 As Justice Ginsburg made clear in her
dissent, "[c]ontraception coverage enables women to avoid the health problems
96. Brief for Respondents at 15, Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (No. 13-354).
97. Id. at 46.
98. Brief for Petitioners at 49, Conestoga, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (No. 13-356).
99. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2782 (quoting Coverage of Certain Preventative Services under the
Affordable Care Act.). Ironically, it was Health and Human Services' consideration of religious interests
that gave the Court the "less restrictive" means of accommodating for-profit religious interests.
100. Venky Nagar, Kathy Petroni & Daniel Wolfenzon, Ownership and Performance in Close
Corporations: A Natural Experiment in Exogenous Ownership Structure, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
WORKING GROUP 1 (Feb. 2002), http://web-docs.stern.nyu.edu/salomon/docs/corporategovemance/S-
CG-02-06.pdf.
101. Brief for the American Civil Liberties Union as Amici Curiae Supporting Government at 9,
Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (No. 13-354).
102. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2799 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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unintended pregnancies may visit on them and their children . . . helps
safeguard the health of women for whom pregnancy may be hazardous, even
life threatening . . . [and] secures benefits wholly unrelated to pregnancy,
preventing certain cancers, menstrual disorders, and pelvic pain."' 103 The
burdens of non-coverage are financial as well; as Justice Ginsburg detailed,
"[t]he cost of an IUD is nearly equivalent to a month's full-time pay for
workers earning the minimum wage . . . almost one-third of women would
change their contraceptive method if costs were not a factor ... and that only
one-fourth of women who request an IUD actually have one inserted after
finding out how expensive it would be."'
10 4
While the Court wholly failed to acknowledge both the true burden on
protected reproductive decision-making and the concrete (and significant)
health and financial burdens on women, the Court instead focused almost solely
on the employers' religious choices to be made under the mandate.' 0 5 As in the
Title VII cases, this focus permits the employer to essentially define the scope
of the asserted religious right and bind its female employees to this same
definition. The case then became one focused on religious liberty, and not one
focused on a true balancing of the competing rights. The female employee's
ability to make reproductive choices becomes subject to the self-defined
religious views of the employer, regardless of whether the employee shares
those beliefs. As Justice Ginsburg made plain in her dissent, this is
unprecedented: "No tradition, and no prior decision under RFRA, allows a
religion-based exemption when the accommodation would be harmful to
others-here, the very persons the contraceptive coverage requirement was
designed to protect."'
0 6
This unprecedented use of RFRA allowed the Court to ignore that the
burden of non-compliance with the mandate is a truly gendered one. In both the
ACA briefing and decision we hear echoes of the Title VII cases discussed
supra: the corporate litigants and Court closed their eyes to the fact that
prescription contraceptive methods are only available to women, and that when
reliable contraceptive methods are not accessible, women uniquely bear the
burden of an unplanned pregnancy. An accommodation from the mandate
fundamentally burdens female employees differently than it burdens male
employees, and that reality cannot be ignored simply because the employer
103. Id.
104. Id. at 2800.
105. The majority decision states: "HHS would put these merchants to a difficult choice: either give
up the right to seek judicial protection of their religious liberty or forgo the benefits, available to their
competitors, of operating as corporations." Id. at 2767. It furthermore writes, "[w]e doubt that the
Congress that enacted RFRA--or, for that matter, ACA-would have believed it a tolerable result to put
family-run businesses to the choice of violating their sincerely held religious beliefs or making all of
their employees lose their existing healthcarc plans." Id. at 2777.
106. Id. at 2801 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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seeking an exemption is a religious one. Senator Barbara Mikulski, the author
of the contraceptive coverage provision, made plain that the provision was
explicitly designed to eradicate this gendered burden: "Often those things
unique to women have not been included in health care reform. Today we
guarantee it and we assure it and we make it affordable by dealing with
copayments and deductibles . ,,107 The government's interest in eradicating
gender discrimination is "an interest of the highest order," and "[t]hat is what is
at. stake in this case given that the contraception rule addresses a vestige of
gender discrimination." 0 8 This interest is not a hypothetical one, but is
grounded in the realities of women's lives. The stark reality for too many
women is that "high costs and discriminatory insurance coverage have been a
real barrier to effective access and use," and this lack of access affects women's
ability to pursue education and work opportunities. 10 9 As amici, the ACLU
succinctly argued in Hobby Lobby:
The contraception rule addresses a remaining vestige of sex
discrimination: the disparities in the cost of health care as between
women and men, the longstanding exclusion of services needed only
by women from health care coverage, and the need for women to have
meaningful access to all forms of contraception if they are to control
unintended pregnancies and thus enjoy greater equality in society. 110
IV. UNTANGLING THE KNOT
The Title VII cases discussed supra involve more than an immutable
characteristic such as sex or race; they involve the immutable characteristic of
sex plus, as characterized by the courts, an element of choice: that is, choosing
to become pregnant out of wedlock or using assisted reproductive technology.
Implicit in the religious employer Title VII cases are arguments that women
choose to have sex or to choose to attempt to get pregnant or to choose to
attempt to prevent pregnancy while working for religious employers, and that
these choices are ones that implicate the employer's religious beliefs. Because
these choices are contrary to the employer's broadly defined religious beliefs
107. Sarah Lipton-Lubet, Promotion Equality: An Analysis of the Contraceptive Coverage Rule,
ACLU 6 (Oct. 2012), https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/promotingequality -
an analysis of the federal contraceptivecoverage rule.pdf.
108. Brief for the American Civil Liberties Union as Amici Curiae Supporting Government at 7,
Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (No. 13-354).
109. Lipton-Lubet, supra note 107, at 6 (noting "the ability to advance in the workplace through
education or on-the-job training, because of the ability to control whether and when to have children, has
narrowed the wage gap between men and women. One study shows that the birth control pill led to
roughly one-third of the total wage gains for women in their forties born in the mid-1940s to early
1950s.").
110. Brief for the American Civil Liberties Union as Amici Curiae Supporting Government at 9,
Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (No. 13-354).
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(as articulated in contractual morality clauses or employment policies), the
courts seemingly accept that the employee's personal exercise of the
reproductive right (one that may well be grounded in the employee's own
moral/religious beliefs) can be subject to the employer's scrutiny. This triggers
courts to entangle the reproductive liberty interest and the religious interest, and
ultimately view these cases as ones where the religious employers' religious
liberty interest subsumes the reproductive right of the employee.
Because of this entanglement of personal reproductive rights (and personal
moral and religious choices) with the employer's religious liberty right, the
statutorily protected right to become pregnant-out of wedlock or through
assisted reproductive technology-and not lose one's job is reframed as the
employee's choice to break an employer's morality clause. The employer's
asserted religious belief is permitted to subsume the employee's choices
regarding reproductive activity-choices that may be personally religious for
the individual woman. The steps that are missing, of course, are these: (1)
recognition that Title VII, as amended by the PDA, explicitly protects this
"choice;" (2) the necessity of examining the morality clauses themselves to
determine if they are discriminatory; and (3) recognition that the burden of such
clauses falls disproportionately on women.
Similarly, the Hobby Lobby majority assumed that the employer's asserted
religious beliefs permitted an exemption from federal law. What was virtually
ignored was that the question at issue was a startlingly gendered one: Hobby
Lobby and Conestoga argued to provide female employees-and only female
employees-with health care coverage that was not comprehensive, and argued
to deny coverage for widely used and highly effective medications available
only to women. The Court assumed, without real question, that an employee's
personal religious and moral choices regarding reproductive decisions are
within an employer's legitimate scope to regulate. As in the Title VII cases, the
employees are forced to comply with the employer's moral or religious beliefs,
regardless of whether they share those beliefs.
The problem with these assumptions can be illustrated by substituting
"race" for "pregnancy" in any of the Title VII cases: if Boyd, Dias, or Herx had
been fired by their religious employers for being African American because the
employer asserted that its religious belief prohibited intermingling of the races
(the "choice" to intermingle), it is difficult to imagine the firing being blessed
by any court.111 If a religious employer's morality clause required its
employees to refrain from exercising the statutorily protected right to vote
under the Voting Rights Act, no court would affirm the validity of the clause.
Yet, as illustrated by the above cases, courts are assuming the validity of
11l. See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (holding that racially-
discriminatory school policies, even when rooted in religious doctrine, arc contrary to public policy and
at odds with the state's compelling interest in eradicating racial discrimination in education).
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morality clauses that require female employees to accept the burden of
refraining from exercising the statutorily protected right to become pregnant
and not lose one's job. Courts assume that employees' reproductive decision
making triggers employers' morality clauses or policies. Likewise, had Hobby
Lobby or Conestoga asserted that their religious beliefs permitted them to
refuse to provide a class of medications only available to a certain race, it is
difficult to imagine the Court so blindly accepting the asserted religious
interest. And yet the courts in both the Title VII and ACA cases have little
problem assuming that of course women's personal reproductive decision
making could offend an employer's religious beliefs, and have little problem
assuming that the employer is permitted to define those beliefs as broadly as it
sees fit-even if doing so tramples on other protected rights.
A look at past Title VII cases dealing with contraceptive coverage more
broadly (that is, not in the context of religious employers) illustrates that
courts' willingness-or unwillingness-to truly examine the gendered nature of
the burden on reproductive freedoms can determine the outcome of the case. In
2001, the Western District of Washington addressed the question of whether
the selective exclusion of prescription contraceptive coverage from an
employer's comprehensive health coverage plan ran afoul of Title VII and the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act.' 12 In finding that this selective exclusion did
violate Title VII, the court held "Title VII does not require employers to offer
any particular type or category of benefit. However, when an employer decides
to offer a prescription plan covering everything except a few specifically
excluded drugs and devices, it has a legal obligation to make sure that the
resulting plan does not discriminate based on sex-based characteristics and that
it provides equally comprehensive coverage for both sexes."11 3 In coming to
this conclusion, the court explicitly recognized that women and men are
differently situated with regard to health care needs, and that blindness to this
reality could not justify discriminatory treatment:
Male and female employees have different, sex-based disability and
healthcare needs, and the law is no longer blind to the fact that only
women can get pregnant, bear children, or use prescription
contraception. The special or increased healthcare needs associated
with a woman's unique sex-based characteristics must be met to the
same extent, and on the same terms, as other healthcare needs. Even if
one were to assume that Bartell's prescription plan was not the result
of intentional discrimination-the exclusion of women-only benefits
from a generally comprehensive prescription plan is sex discrimination
under Title VII.l
14
112. Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1266 (W.D. Wash. 2001).
113. Id. at 1272.
114. Id. at 1271-72.
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Six years later the Eighth Circuit faced precisely the same question;
whether an employer's selective exclusion of contraception from a
comprehensive health care plan violated Title VII. 115 In finding that this
exclusion was not discriminatory, the Eighth Circuit found the proper
comparators for Title VII purposes were comparisons between the "coverage
for female contraception (prescription contraception) [and the coverage for]
male contraception (condoms and vasectomies)" 16 and stated:
[T]his case concerns Union Pacific's coverage of contraception for
men ,and women. The proper comparator is the provision of the
medical benefit in question, contraception. Union Pacific's health
plans do not cover any contraception used by women such as birth
control, sponges, diaphragms, intrauterine devices or tubal ligations or
any contraception used by men such as condoms and vasectomies.
Therefore, the coverage provided to women is not less favorable than
that provided to men. Thus, there is no violation of Title VII. 11
7
Erickson and Union Pacific illustrate that when courts actually consider the
realities associated with sex, pregnancy, and contraception, the true nature of
the gendered burdens are clear. The Eighth Circuit's analysis, of course, blinks
reality on several fronts. First, the only prescription contraceptives available on
the market are those for women. Second, only women can get pregnant. Indeed,
Judge Bye, writing in dissent, objected to the majority's choice of comparators,
and explicitly recognized the gendered nature of the burden, writing,
"contraception [is a] gender-specific, female issue because of the adverse
health consequences of an unplanned pregnancy (or even the general health
consequences of any pregnancy). . . .Women are uniquely and specifically
disadvantaged by Union Pacific's failure to cover prescription
contraception."" 18 When courts, such as the Eighth Circuit, do not acknowledge
the gendered nature of the burden we end up with strawmen about comparative
classes completely divorced from reality. This same pattern is seen in the ACA
cases: when the analysis of the need for contraceptive coverage ignores what
such coverage actually means for women's lives, it is not surprising that the
employer's interests prevailed.
The EEOC recently published updated guidance on sex and pregnancy
discrimination that explicitly resolved the Erickson/Union Pacific split in
decisions on conceptive coverage and made clear that the exclusion of
contraception coverage from a comprehensive health care plan is
115. In re Union Pac. R.R. Emp't Practices Litig., 479 F.3d 936, 944 (8th Cir. 2007).
116. Id. at 948 (Bye, J., dissenting).
117. Id. at 944.
118. Id. at 948-49 (Bye, J., dissenting).
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discriminatory. The EEOC guidance explains that "[e]mployers who have
health insurance benefit plans must apply the same terms and conditions for
pregnancy-related costs as medical costs unrelated to pregnancy."
' 9
Specifically on contraceptive coverage, the Guidance explains that "[t]he plan
must cover prescription contraceptives on the same basis as prescription drugs,
devices, and services that are used to prevent the occurrence of medical
conditions other than pregnancy." 120 The EEOC explains that the reason this
must be so is "[b]ecause prescription contraceptives are available only for
women," and "a health insurance plan facially discriminates against women on
the basis of gender if it excludes prescription contraception but otherwise
provides comprehensive coverage."' 12 1 As such, the EEOC has adopted the
approach to health insurance coverage that is consistent with the Erickson's
court's contextual view of sex, pregnancy, and contraception.
CONCLUSION
The ACA contraceptive mandate cases and the Title VII pregnancy
discrimination cases demonstrate the religious liberty and reproductive rights
"knot." In Boyd, we see the courts holding that being pregnant and unwed
violates the school's religious policy prohibiting extramarital sex, but finding
that the policy creates a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for firing a
pregnant employee. In Dias, the court extends the logic in Boyd to cases where
pregnancy was due to artificial insemination rather than extramarital sex,
finding that, so long as the religious policy against artificial insemination was
applied in a gender-neutral way, it could act as a legitimate, non-discriminatory
reason for adverse employment treatment. In Herx, the employer adapts this
argument. Rather than claiming that the non-renewal of Herx's contract was
due to the legitimate, non-discriminatory reason of a violation of a morals
clause, the employer asserts that the non-renewal was a religious decision
exempted from Title VII under the religious exemption. In Hobby Lobby, the
Supreme Court explained that the burden on employees of permitting a
business to be exempt from all or some of the contraceptive mandate is
minimal or even non-existent and implicitly held that the religious
corporations' sincerely held beliefs trump the asserted reproductive or gender
equity right.
But, of course, policies that permit firing on the basis of pregnancy, or on
the basis of premarital sex, can very rarely be truly gender neutral, even if
grounded in religious beliefs. The sexes simply demonstrate and experience the
119. EEOC Enforcement Guidance: Pregnancy Discrimination and Related Issues, No. 915.003, §
(i)(A)(4)(a) (July 14, 2014).
120. Id.
121. Id. at §(i)(A)(1), (i)(A)(3)(d).
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effects of sex and pregnancy in different ways, and women, of course, have
visible manifestations of sexual activity and pregnancy. The fact that a religious
employer has declared a policy neutral does not make it so. The question that
must be asked is whether such policies, even when based on the employer's
religious beliefs, can be squared with Title VII, or, in the ACA cases, the
government's interest in eradicating gender discrimination. The sex
discrimination claim must be actually balanced against the employer's assertion
of religious liberty. This inquiry cannot be a hypothetical one: it must be
grounded in the realities of sex, gender and pregnancy-including effects on
educational and work opportunities, health consequences, and considerations of
reproductive autonomy. And this inquiry must recognize that simply because
an employer has a religious belief about reproductive decision-making (such as
the decision to have sex, become pregnant, or use contraception) does not mean
that its religious liberty interest can subsume the employees' reproductive and
gender equity rights. A genuine inquiry will avoid automatically conflating
women's sexuality and reproductive decision making with "moral" or
"religious" issues, and thus allow for a true consideration of both rights and the
untangling of the reproductive rights and religious liberty knot.
When faced with evaluating those interests and potential burdens in the
face of employers' claims of religiously liberty courts all too often view them
through the lens of religious liberty, rather than through the lens of sex
discrimination. As we see in comparing Erickson and Union Pacific and in the
new EEOC Guidance, when courts do evaluate the interests in gender equity
and reproductive autonomy, and particularly when courts evaluate the actual
effects of policies impacting reproductive rights-such as contraceptive
coverage policies-it affects the outcome of cases. This is a practical and tried
approach to untangle the reproductive right and religious liberty knot.

